Transparency Boost Needed for European Parliament Cross-Party Groups

Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), October 2006

The European Energy Forum takes MEPs on an adventurous trip to the Arctic region, sponsored by a large oil firm. The secretariat of the Sky and Space Intergroup is run by the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe. Cross-party groups are clearly an increasingly popular way for business lobbyists to mingle with and influence select groups of MEPs. The Parliament’s current rules on intergroups are too limited and weakly enforced to secure even the basic levels of transparency around the activities, composition and funding sources of intergroups and MEP-industry forums.

The influence of lobbying on European Union decision-making is currently under the spotlight, for instance as part of the debate around the European Transparency Initiative (ETI). One aspect yet to receive attention is the role that cross-party groups of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) play as vehicles for lobbying.

This report focuses on two specific types of groups. The first is the ‘intergroup’, which consist of MEPs from different political groups. Currently 25 intergroups are registered and officially recognised. Many more informal cross-party groups of MEPs refer to themselves as intergroups. Some observers estimate the total number of intergroups (including those which are not registered) to be over 80. The unregistered intergroups are not covered by the European Parliament’s rules introduced in 1999.

The second type is a grouping that involves MEPs from different parties together with corporate lobbyists. These hybrid groups do not consider themselves to be intergroups and will be referred to as ‘MEP-industry forums’ in this report. These groups are not bound by any parliamentary ethics and transparency rules at all, and this lack of scrutiny makes it hard to determine how many exist. However, our research shows that these MEP-industry forums are de facto lobbying vehicles for corporate interests aiming to influence EU decision-making in their favour. In both the case of intergroups and MEP-industry forums, there is a huge lack of transparency around their membership and activities, and notably around their sources of financing.

In the United Kingdom, ‘all party groups’ – comparable to intergroups and MEP-industry forums in the EU context – have recently undergone serious scrutiny by the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner, following the discovery by The Times that representatives of the nuclear, pharmaceutical and drinks industries were giving financial support to supposedly independent groups of Members of Parliament (MPs), and even writing policy reports on their behalf. In the UK tighter rules are planned after an inquiry into the activities of British MPs and lobbyists in these groups.

This report shows that the European Parliament’s current rules on intergroups fail to prevent co-optation by lobby groups and fail to secure even minimal transparency around the ever-growing number of cross-party groups. Tighter transparency obligations for all cross-party groups of MEPs should be introduced as soon as possible.

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1 European Commissioner Siim Kallas started a heated debate in a major speech in March 2005 when he concluded that transparency around the activities of lobbyists in Brussels is “too deficient in comparison to the impact of their activities.” To help overcome this problem, he launched the European Transparency Initiative.

2 This report is based on interviews by Fatoumata Jawara with MEPs and coordinators of intergroups and similar groupings conducted between March and May 2006, as well as internet research.

3 UK MEPs sometimes refer to EU-level cross-party groups as ‘all-party groups’. An example is the group “MEPs Against Cancer”, founded by Lib Dem MEP Liz Lynne.


5 See the report Lobbying and All Party Groups, Committee on Standards and Privileges, House of Commons, May 2006.
UK all-party groups
Following its investigation, The Times submitted a complaint to the Committee on Standards and Privileges about six UK all-party groups that violated parliamentary transparency rules by failing to disclose the source of their financial and secretarial support. Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards Sir Philip Mawer led an inquiry into the activities of British Members of Parliament (MPs) and lobbyists in these groups, which have mushroomed to a stunning 442. In May 2006, Mawer’s report concluded that the all-party groups were “not neutral surveyors of a particular area of public policy, but conduits ... for pressure to change public policy”. And: “Those with a special interest in a particular issue have the potential to gain considerably from the access to an all-party group”. One of Mawer’s key recommendations is for lobbying consultancies to start disclosing their client lists. The current voluntary code provides ample loopholes for lobbying consultancies who want to preserve secrecy about who they work for. Mawer’s transparency recommendations could be implemented early next year.

MEPs and lobbyists
Lobbying in Brussels is big business. It is estimated that over 15,000 lobbyists work in Brussels and around two-thirds are representing the interests of industry. One industry insider has estimated the annual turnover of corporate EU lobbying to be between 750 million to 1 billion euro. With its increasing powers, the European Parliament has become a major target for lobbyists. Faced with a vast workload due to their expanding policy-making mandate, for the 732 elected MEPs, the pressure is on. Much of this work involves highly technical issues with often far-reaching social and environmental impacts. Given this situation, a common remark from MEPs is that lobbyists are indispensable for expertise, a dependency exacerbated by a lack of resources for independent assessment and research within the Parliament itself. Industry lobbyists, who can afford to enlist support from public affaires and law firms, are clear beneficiaries as they are able to promote their interests and agenda through analysis and information provision. Other stakeholders, which include environmental and public health NGOs, work hard to inform MEPs of their positions and concerns. However, these civil society efforts pale in comparison to the scale of the activities that the army of corporate lobbyists is able to engage in to sway policy making in their favour.

EP rules on Intergroups
Intergroups are informal bodies of MEPs with membership from different political groups from within the European Parliament. While intergroups are not considered organs of the European Parliament, officially recognised intergroups are resourced by the Parliament with meeting space and translation facilities.

As can be seen from the lists of registered and non-registered intergroups in annex 1 and 2, intergroups are very diverse. They include: Country specific intergroups focusing on policies linked to certain countries, such as Friends of Israel, Friends of a Free Iran and the Tibet intergroups; Policy centred intergroups like the Consumer and Health, Disability, and the Anti-racism and Diversity intergroups; European Parliamentary affiliates of global parliamentary networks such as GLOBE (Global Legislators for a Balanced Environment) and GOPAC-Europe (Parliamentarians Against Corruption); and Crosscutting intergroups covering a wide range of issues such as the Globalisation intergroup, the Sky and Space intergroup, SOS Democracy and the Federalist Intergroup for the European Constitution.

6 Three all-party groups failed to disclose the source of their financial and secretarial support – Intellectual Property, Patient Safety and Pharmacy. Only after a complaint was upheld against them, the consultancy firm running the secretariats of these groups, Luther Pendragon, listed the groups’ funding sources on the Parliament website. Another consultancy firm, however, used a loophole by saying their work for several all-party groups was done independently from their clients.
The number of intergroups continues to grow. An MEP with a particular appetite for intergroups is Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, who has within the last year co-founded no less than four such initiatives, none of which are officially recognized intergroups:

- COMETIS (Committee for a European Technology Institute in Strasbourg)
- the European Life Science Circle (ELSC)
- the Circle for Research and Innovation in the European Parliament
- Patient Information Network (PIN)

Since the mid-1990’s concerns have been raised about the potential of intergroups to overshadow official Parliamentary Committees. This was further compounded by concern about the influence of lobby groups on intergroups. The impossibility of providing very large numbers of intergroups with meeting rooms and translations also sparked debate about how to regulate this phenomenon. As a result, in 1999, the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament laid out more detailed rules regarding the establishment of intergroups.

### Why start an intergroup?

Understanding the role of the intergroup is complex. Corbett suggests that intergroups enable MEPs to form cross-party coalitions on specific issues of interest, which can foster wider political friendships and consensus building within the European Parliament. Another reason for the proliferation of cross-party groups in the European Parliament is that political parties are weakly developed on the EU level. The party groups in the EP being far more heterogeneous than parties in national parliaments, MEPs are more likely to seek alliances across parties around specific issues and interests. The United Kingdom is one of few EU member states where a similar phenomenon exists: all-party groups.

In order to obtain recognition as an inter-group, at least three political parties within the European Parliament must endorse and become members of the group. Due to limits on the number of signatures available to the political parties represented in the Parliament, the maximum number of official intergroups is 26. The most recent official list (dated December 2004) includes 24 recognised intergroups (see annex 1), With the Health and Consumer Intergroup the current total is 25.

The rules further state that official intergroups must declare “all direct or indirect financial support which, if offered to Members as individuals, would have to be declared”. The register of these declarations “shall be open to the public for inspection”.

Public access to the European Parliament’s Intergroup register is not exactly straightforward. Firstly, the register is not available on the internet. Interested citizens have to make an appointment with the parliamentary staff who are responsible for keeping the register. When CEO visited the office in the Henri Spaak wing of the European Parliament in Brussels we were presented with two binders containing information about the 25 officially recognised intergroups. Photocopying or taking pictures was not allowed. The information in the binders is very

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7 Intergroups were seen as “enabling organised interests to have uncontrolled influence on MEPs”. “Shaping the New Europe”, PhD dissertation by Rebekka Göhring, FU Berlin (2004).

8 As described in the Rules Governing the Establishment of Intergroups – Decision of the Conference of Presidents of 16th December 1999 (consolidated May 2004). See Annex 1 to this report.


10 See also Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, Desmond Dinan, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

11 See Rules governing the establishment of intergroups. The EPP and PES groups have each 21 signatures, smaller groups like Greens and GUE have each 8 signatures.

12 Article 6 of the rules on intergroups states that: “The declaration of financial interests, which shall be drawn up under the personal responsibility of the Intergroup Chairs, shall be made annually. The officers of the intergroups shall be required to declare all direct or indirect financial support which, if offered to Members as individuals, would have to be declared…”

13 Article 7 emphasises that: “The Quaestors shall keep a register of the declarations of financial interests submitted by the Intergroup Chairman. That register shall be open to the public for inspection.”
limited and many Intergroups fail to fulfil key transparency requirements. Membership information was often missing or out of date. Several intergroups did not disclose outside support, for instance secretariat services. The Sky and Space Intergroup, which is hosted by the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) did not mention this support in the register. The register had last been visited more than six months before, by an assistant of an MEP.

The rules introduced in 1999 have only been effective in one aspect: they have reduced the number of officially recognised intergroups. This may be seen as an advantage in terms of the allocation of European Parliament meeting rooms and translation facilities. For the wider issues surrounding the intergroups phenomenon, the current rules are however clearly insufficient. The number of self-defined but unregistered intergroups has continued to increase. More importantly, the rules introduced have not achieved the objective of increasing the transparency of intergroups; as many as 60 unregistered ‘intergroups’ remain outside of the sphere of parliamentary rules. As one academic observer puts it, the current rules mean that “most intergroups have to remain in the ‘underworld’ of parliamentary activity instead of being exposed to the light of public scrutiny.”

The current rules not only exclude a large number of de facto intergroups from official status (as well as corresponding obligations), but instead have created the ironic situation that there are major advantages emerging from not having official status. While the official intergroups have the right to meetings rooms and translation into five languages, they are only allowed to meet in Strasbourg. The non-registered groups, meanwhile, do not face any such restrictions and frequently meet in the European Parliament’s building in Brussels. Among the official intergroups, there is growing dissatisfaction with this situation.

**Intergroups and lobbying**

The fact that most intergroups – both the officially recognised and the informal ones – provide very limited or no external transparency around their activities is problematic because intergroups are often being used as lobbying vehicles. Those who expected the 1999 rules to reduce the influence of lobby groups on MEP intergroups must conclude that this has clearly not worked. As Honor Mahony points out in a recent article on EUobserver.com, “intergroups are seen as a valuable ‘second-level’ lobbying option by lobbyists.” One Brussels-based lobbyist is quoted for saying that “They save time. Instead of going to one MEP at a time, we can hit a whole group at once with our arguments.”

One such example of an intergroup providing lobbyists with an efficient short cut to get access to MEPs on a certain topic is the Sky and Space Intergroup. This officially recognised intergroup is hosted by the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), Europe’s leading arms industry lobby group. ASD provides the intergroup’s secretariat, coordinates its activities and admits to lobbying MEPs through the intergroup. The Sky and Space Intergroup does not have a website and it fails to disclose its funding sources.

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14 The binders included the documents required to register the intergroups (most of those filed in the Autumn of 2004), outlining the purpose of the intergroup and listing founding and regular members. In some cases there was no membership list and clearly the membership lists had never been updated since registration of the intergroups and are therefore far from precise. For all intergroups there were forms on which the chairs should declare any outside support. Only a few intergroups that receive secretarial support from NGOs and lobby groups actually reported this outside support.

15 In a 2005 publication, Richard Corbett MEP, estimated that there are over 80 intergroups. The European Parliament, Sixth Edition, 2005 (Richard Corbett MEP et al). The authors noted that regulation of intergroups intended to prevent abuse and limit their number turned registered groups into semi-official EP bodies. In addition, a large number of non-registered intergroups operating outside the system evolved.


17 Consumer and food lobbies continue old EU dance, by Honor Mahony, EUobserver, June 6th 2006.

18 ASD is the result of a merger between AECMA, EUROSPACE and EDIG in 2004. Members of ASD include the Society of British Aerospace Companies, the Swedish Aerospace Industries, the Netherlands Aerospace Industries and other national aerospace associations from EU member states. Information about ASD is available on [http://www.asd-europe.org](http://www.asd-europe.org).

19 Interview with Steven Tebbe (AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe – ASD), April 2006.
The Health and Consumer Intergroup in the European Parliament is an example of an intergroup used for lobbying purposes by public interest NGOs. This intergroup, however, is far more transparent and has accountability mechanisms in place which are lacking in the case of the Sky and Space Intergroup. The European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC) and the European Public Health Alliance (EPHA) act as the secretariat of the Health and Consumer Intergroup. The website of this intergroup provides full transparency on all key aspects of the group’s functioning. The governance structure of the intergroup moreover ensures that the MEP members of the groups’ bureau decide the agenda of meetings.

MEP-industry forums
MEP-industry forums are cross-party groups of MEPs that do not consider themselves intergroups and which have a major involvement of corporate lobbyists. Many of these groupings were established by MEPs from different parties and all of them feature MEPs in key roles within the organisation, but the agenda of these groups is heavily influenced or entirely controlled by corporate lobbyists. Most of these groups are primarily funded by their business members. While MEP-industry forums exhibit similar characteristics to intergroups, they claim to be independent bodies. This releases them from parliamentary scrutiny and obligations to abide by rules governing – at least the official – intergroups. Lack of registration requirements and low levels of transparency make it very difficult to estimate the number of MEP-industry forums. Research for this report easily identified ten of them, but there might be many more. Many major industry sectors have ‘their own’ MEP-industry forum: software, telecom, financial services, arms, energy, nuclear, construction, ceramics, automobile, pharmaceuticals, etc.

While some MEP-industry forums focus on specific issues (for example the European Energy Forum and the Forum for the Automobile and Society), others are more cross-cutting. The Kangaroo Group, for example covers a wide range of issues, from defence to energy, taxation to biotechnology and from health to the media. A qualified guess is that more than 1/3 of MEPs are involved in MEP-industry forums. While some of these groupings have only a handful of MEPs involved, MEP-industry forums typically involve 30-70 MEPs. The Kangaroo Group says to have the support of no less than 150 MEPs.

Examples of MEP-industry forums
Kangaroo Group (Karl von Wogau) – www.kangaroogroup.org – About 150 MEPs actively support the group

Transatlantic Policy Network (Erika Mann) – www.tponline.org – 70 MEPs in the TPN’s European Parliamentary Committee

European Internet Foundation – www.eifonline.org – 60 MEPs

Forum for the Automobile and Society (Malcolm Harbour, Garrelt Duin) – www.autoandsociety.com – 40 MEPs

European Parliament Ceramics Industry Forum (Malcolm Harbour, Bill Cashman) – no website – unclear how many MEPs are involved

European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (Piaa Noora-Kauppi) – www.epfsf.org – 15 MEPs on steering committee

Forum for the Future of Nuclear Energy (Terry Wynn) – no website – unclear how many MEPs are involved

European Energy Forum (Giles Chichester) – www.f-e-e.org – 37 MEPs are ‘active members’

See http://intergroup.epha.org/.

Transparency failure
With only a few exceptions, it is hard to obtain information on how MEP-industry forums are funded. If they have a website funding or expenditure information tends to be absent, while many of them explicitly refuse to disclose basic financial information when requested to do so during this research project. An exception is the European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (EPFSF) which has recently stepped up its financial transparency. The EPFSP website now includes a summary of how its annual budget of over €190,000 is spent.21

The amounts invested by industry in the running of these forums are substantial. The EPFSF’s corporate members, mainly lobbyists for large banks and insurance firms, each pay 6,000 euro per year membership fee. According to an MEP chairing the Forum in the European Parliament for Construction (FOCOPE), “other Forums are charging a minimum 5000€ up to 25.000€” in annual corporate membership. Corporate members, moreover, often additionally sponsor specific lunch or dinner debates.

The dependency of these forums on corporate interest groups often goes very far. The Forum for the Automobile and Society (FAS), for instance, is run from the Brussels lobbying headquarters of the International Automobile Federation (FIA). In other cases, like the European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (EPFSF) or the Forum in the European Parliament for Construction (FOCOPE), the secretariats are hosted by lobbying consultancy firms. The EPFSF is run by Houston Consulting Europe, whereas FOCOPE is run from the Brussels offices of Aspinall Associates.22

Lobbying vehicles
MEP-industry forums are in various ways used as lobbying vehicles by corporate interests. Some forums claim to be non-partisan or reject being involved in lobbying yet they produce often detailed position papers on policy and legislative issues being discussed at the European Parliament. Some MEPs have admitted to being reliant on these forums to help shape their arguments on crucial issues discussed at the European Parliament.

The European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (EPFSF), for instance, is used by its industry members as a channel for lobbying MEPs. An example was the 2005 Money Laundering Directive, which was watered down at least in part due to efforts by the EPFSF’s Financial Industry Committee. Like other MEP-industry forums, the EPFSF’s membership does not include NGOs or other representatives of non-commercial interests.

Some examples of how big business interests use these forums as lobbying vehicles to influence European Parliament policy making:
- Among the lobbying activities of the European Energy Forum (EEF) are frequent dinners and lunches, but also tours for MEPs, such as the recent visit to an Arctic region in Norway where oil companies are seeking permission to drill and excursions to nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe.
- The Kangaroo Group, with no less than 150 MEPs involved, was instrumental in lobbying to weaken the EU’s new rules for testing and approval of chemicals (REACH).
- Corporate lobbyists and MEPs united in the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) lobby together for an EU-US free trade zone. The TPN has run into controversy in the US over its generous offering of travel, hotel lodging and expensive dinners to US (and EU) lawmakers.

22 An example of the often blurred roles of these forums is that FOCOPE has two accredited lobbyists in the European Parliament, one of which is Kremena Mileva, a lobbying consultant at Aspinall Associates.
- The European Internet Foundation (EIF), with 60 MEPs involved, has been used as a lobbying vehicle by Microsoft and other software and telecom corporations.
- The corporate members of the Forum for the Automobile and Society (FAS) have a strong say in the agenda for discussion at the meetings of the Forum, which has 40 MEP members.

Different groups are employing different methods to achieve influence. The Kangaroo Group, for instance, has acquired a mixed reputation for its methods to influence MEPs. The strategies used include organising lavish working lunches, dinners and study tours as a way of shaping MEPs’ thinking and thereby influencing policy. A number of MEPs interviewed for this report expressed their unease with this approach, and no longer attend such gatherings.

**Recommendations**

In all their diversity, cross-party groups (whether official intergroups, non-recognised intergroups or MEP-industry forums) are a popular means of lobbying to influence the European Parliament. Despite their differences, all of these categories of cross-party groups are potentially vulnerable to co-optation by lobbyists, and although there are positive exceptions, transparency around the role of lobby groups is missing for an overwhelming majority of cross-party groups. This underlines the urgency of a thorough review of the failing European Parliament rules around intergroups.

Improving the rules around cross-party groups is an important part of the European Parliament’s challenge in the context of the European Transparency Initiative (ETI). In its Green Paper on the ETI (May 2006), the European Commission rightfully states that “When lobby groups seek to contribute to EU policy development, it must be clear to the general public which input they provide to the European institutions. It must also be clear who they represent, what their mission is and how they are funded.”

Lobbying via European Parliament cross-party groups is clearly an area where far more visibility is needed. The current lack of voluntary transparency shows the need for clear rules to make such disclosure obligatory. The implicit and often explicit rejection of our requests for information about the funding sources of MEP-industry forums underlines that voluntary approaches are very unlikely to deliver.

We would like to offer the following recommendations for improving European Parliament rules on intergroups and other cross-party groups:

- As a first step, the basic information on registered intergroups should be made more easily available through a website maintained by the European Parliament. The online Register of All-Party Groups of the UK House of Commons shows how this can be done.
- The enforcement of the current rules for officially recognised intergroups must be improved. Particularly, the disclosure of up-to-date membership and funding information must be secured. All outside parties involved in the activities of the groups should be fully disclosed.
- Transparency obligations should be introduced for all cross-party groups involving MEPs, including unregistered intergroups and MEP-industry forums. Mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that all these groups are registered and that key information is fully disclosed to the public. This would help enable public scrutiny and contribute to exposing any undue lobbying tactics. While there might be practical reasons for limiting the number of recognised intergroups with rights to meeting rooms and translation facilities, this could be achieved in a manner that does not exclude the large majority of cross-party groups from ethics and transparency obligations. The priority must be to secure effective transparency for all cross-party groups operating in and around the European Parliament. In the UK, registration is compulsory for any group that includes MPs from more than one party and has at least one officer from the House of Commons. This would be an obvious step forward for the European Parliament.

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24 [Register of All-Party Groups](https://www.parliament.uk/business/register-of-all-party-groups), House of Commons.
While not a major focus of this report, we have in our research come across numerous examples of cross-party groups offering smaller or larger gifts and other benefits and services to MEPs. We recommend the European Parliament to review which of these practices create unacceptable conflicts of interests. In the US, Congressional Ethics Rules are likely to be further tightened after it has become clear that Members of Congress continue to receive millions of dollars per year in free travel and other benefits from lobby groups and companies hoping to gain influence.

Finally, we recommend that the European Parliament studies the recommendations published in May 2006 by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards on how to improve the regulatory situation around UK ‘All-Party Groups’. The recommendations, for instance, for securing full transparency around the role of consultancies in All-Party Groups are entirely relevant at the EU level.

Key recommendations for UK ‘All-Party Groups’

- Consultancies should clarify and name any clients whose interests overlap with the all-party group they provide secretariat support for, regardless of whether they assist in funding.
- Where assistance is provided by a charity or not-for-profit organisation, “The name of any commercial company with a direct interest in the work of the APG which contributes materially to meeting the central costs of the charity should be listed.”
- Publications (including reports and press releases) produced by APGs should carry the name of their author(s), the organisation(s) which provide secretariat services to the Group, and any relevant client or sponsor.

Boosting the EP’s Research Capacity

One of the reasons that many MEPs are attracted by industry-dominated cross-party groups is their need for information on the often very complex technical dossiers discussed in the European Parliament. In a study from 2003, Brigitte Reck concludes that the European Parliament lacks “the necessary in-house evaluation and information gathering capacity”. Reck stresses that “there is a need for the European Parliament to have autonomous resources of expertise, in order to be independent from the expertise of the Commission and private interest”.

Some steps have been taken in recent years to address these problems, for instance by upgrading the parliamentary library and by recruiting what the Parliament’s Secretary General Julian Priestley describes as “a number of highly qualified experts in key policy areas, able to advise the parliament on technical issues”. However, controversy has risen recently about David Earnshaw, one of seven 'external experts' advising the EP’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. How independent is the advice coming from the Managing Director of the lobbying consultancy giant Burson-Marsteller and the former Brussels lobbyist of the pharmaceutical multinational SmithKline Beecham (now GlaxoSmithKline)?

25 UEFA (the Union of European Football Association), for instance, foots the bills of dinner meetings of Friends of Football, a non-official intergroup run from the office of MEP Chris Heaton-Harris. UEFA also offers the MEPs free tickets and hotel lodging (but not travel) to major international football games. In July 2006 members of the European Energy Forum went on a 3-day visit to the Barents region in Norway, including a cruise along the coast and various excursions, all paid for by Norwegian oil company Statoil.

26 See the report Lobbying and All Party Groups, Committee on Standards and Privileges, House of Commons, May 2006.

27 Ibid.


29 Lobbying is part of democratic process, letter from Julian Priestley (Secretary General of the European Parliament) published in the Financial Times, January 25 2006.

30 An Insider in Brussels: Lobbyists Reshape the European Union, Elke Cronenberg for CorpWatch.org, September 18th 2006.
Appendix 1

The Secretaries General of the Political Groups agreed on the establishment of the following intergroups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intergroup</th>
<th>Political Group(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGING</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; UEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI-RACISM AND DIVERSITY</td>
<td>PSE; ALDE; GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTIC EUROPE (&amp; KALININGRAD)</td>
<td>EPP-ED; ALDE; PSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOETHICS</td>
<td>EPP-ED; IND/DEM; V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINEMA AND AUDIOVISUAL POLICY (&amp; diversité culturelle)</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISABILITY INTERGROUP</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; ALDE; GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY AND PROTECTION OF CHILDHOOD</td>
<td>EPP-ED; IND/DEM; UEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDERALIST INTERGROUP FOR THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION</td>
<td>PSE; ALDE; EPP-ED</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIELDSPORTS, FISHING AND CONSERVATION (Chasse)</td>
<td>EPP-ED; IND/DEM; UEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOURTH WORLD EUROPEAN COMMITTEE</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAY and LESBIANS RIGHTS</td>
<td>PSE, ALDE, V</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLOBALISATION</td>
<td>PSE; GUE; V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE INITIATIVE</td>
<td>V; GUE; PSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESS</td>
<td>PSE; ALDE; V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKY AND SPACE INTERGROUP</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; GUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME (Small &amp; Medium Sized Enterprises)</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; IND/DEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL ECONOMY</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; ALDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIBET</td>
<td>EPP-ED; V; UEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOURISM (Railway Policy and Tourism)</td>
<td>EPP-ED; ALDE; PSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADE UNION COORDINATION GROUP</td>
<td>PSE; GUE; EPP-ED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL NATIONAL MINORITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL REGIONS AND REGIONAL LANGUAGES</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; ALDE;</td>
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<tr>
<td>URBAN (Housing)</td>
<td>PSE; ALDE; EPP-ED</td>
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<tr>
<td>VITICULTURE – TRADITION – QUALITE</td>
<td>EPP-ED; IND/DEM; UEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>WELFARE AND CONSERVATION OF ANIMALS</td>
<td>EPP-ED; PSE; V</td>
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8.12.2004
Appendix 2


Non-registered Intergroups active in late 2004

GLOBE (Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, Anders Wijkman)
Kangaroo group (Karl von Wogau)
Land Use and Food Policy LUFPIG (Terry Wynn)
Referendum on Constitution – No campaign (Jens Peter Bonde)
Consumer Forum (Karin Scheele)
Mining (Bernard Rapkay)
Western Sahara (Peace for the Saharawi People) (Karin Scheele, Carlos Camera)
Progressive Women (Lissy Gröner)
Roma Rights (Katalin Leval)
Camino de Santiago: European Cultural Itinerary (C. Gutierrez, Janelly Fourtou, Ines Ayala)
Cancer (Alojz Peterle)
Ecumenical Prayer Breakfast
Europeans Abroad (Jean-Louis Bourlanges)
Forum for the Future of Nuclear Energy (Terry Wynn)
Friends of a Free Iran (Paolo Casaca, Struan Stevenson)
Fruit and Vegetables (Beatrice Patrie: Joseph Daul)
Islands (Manuel Medina, T. Riera Madurell)
Law Enforcement, Organised Crime and Terrorism (William Newton Dunn)
Mountains (Catherine Guy-Quint, Boguslaw Sonik)
Sports
Friends of Football (Chris Heaton Harris)

Some other Intergroups active in recent years

Friends of Israel
Health
Stateless Nations
Paneuropean
Taxation of capital, tax policy, and globalisation Children’s Rights
Local and Regional Representatives
Peace for the Saharaui People
Sustainable Development
Beer Club
Social Economy
Appendix 3

Brussels, 23 September 2004

Rules governing the establishment of intergroups

Article 1
Intergroups are not organs of Parliament and may not, therefore, express opinions on behalf of Parliament.

Article 2
Intergroups shall use neither the name and logo of the European Parliament nor any names which might lead to confusion with the official organs of the European Parliament such as parliamentary committees, interparliamentary delegations and joint parliamentary committees. Intergroups which do so, notwithstanding this provision, shall not be eligible to use Parliament’s technical facilities.

Article 3
Intergroups may not undertake any activities which might result in confusion with the official activities of Parliament or of its organs and which might adversely affect relations with the other Institutions of the Union or with non-member countries.

Article 4
The establishment of intergroups shall be subject to the following conditions:
- applications must be submitted by Members for signing by the Chairs of at least three political groups. The political groups shall be allocated a limited number of signatures for given parliamentary term, as indicated in the attached allocation scheme (Annex 1) which shall be revised at the beginning of each new parliamentary term,
- to be admissible, applications must be accompanied by the appropriate form (Annex II) and a declaration of financial interests (Annex III), pursuant to Article 2 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure,
- applications must be accompanied by a list of the members of the intergroup.

Article 5
Once established, intergroups must notify their names to the political group responsible for the coordination of the intergroups, and a declaration must be made to the College of Quaestors, accompanied by the documents referred to in Article 4. Any change must be notified to the Coordination of the political groups at the earliest opportunity. The political group responsible for the coordination of the intergroups shall ensure that all the Group Chairs, the secretaries-general of the political groups and Parliament’s Administration are duly informed of all notifications.

Article 6
The declaration of financial interests, which shall be drawn up under the personal responsibility of the Intergroup Chairs, shall be made annually. The officers of the intergroups shall be required to declare all direct or indirect financial support which, if offered to Members as individuals, would have to be declared pursuant to Article 2 of Annex I to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

Article 7
The Quaestors shall keep a register of the declarations of financial interests submitted by the Intergroup Chairs. The register shall be open to the public for inspection.

Article 8
Before entering a declaration in the register of the financial interests of the intergroups, the Quaestors may request any additional information which they need in order to establish each
intergroup’s objectives clearly and accurately and to ensure transparency in the running of the intergroups.

Article 9
Technical infrastructure, conference rooms and interpretation facilities shall be made available by the political groups only subject to the following conditions:
- intergroups may meet only during part-sessions in Strasbourg, on Wednesday afternoons or Thursdays,
- intergroups must comply with the same timetabling restrictions as apply to meetings of the official organs of Parliament. In particular, they may not under any circumstances meet at voting time during part-sessions of the European Parliament.

Article 10
At the beginning of each parliamentary term, the intergroups shall be required to resubmit their applications for establishment under the terms laid down in these Rules.

ANNEX I

Number of signatures available to the political groups for the establishment of intergroups during the sixth legislative term (2004-2009):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPP-ED</th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>ALDE</th>
<th>Greens/ALE</th>
<th>GUE</th>
<th>Ind/Dem</th>
<th>UEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The signatures allocation scheme is determined at the beginning of each parliamentary term in accordance with an agreement between the political groups.