It clarifies how the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) in particular performs an agenda-setting role, resulting in the prioritization by the EU of new policies benefitting transnational corporations (TNCs). This is evident in plans for ‘completing the internal market’, which will mean deregulating and liberalizing a number of sectors such as transport, telecommunications and energy. EU efforts to push for global free trade can also be traced to industrial priorities. Furthermore, the introduction of ‘benchmarking’ – comparing wages, taxes, infrastructure and potentially all other fields with the situation of global competitors – as a decision-making tool is a disturbing example of how the EU has made international competitiveness its overriding concern.
Whereas the ERT sketches out the general policy direction and avoids the details of legislation, UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe) uses its extremely efficient lobbying machine to ensure that the interests of business are integrated into every niche of EU legislation. Although these two main industry lobby organizations differ in focus and working style, their overall vision is strikingly similar.
The ERT has proven remarkably flexible in adapting to evolving circumstances with its creation of new organizational structures whenever beneficial. This adaptation was visible with the transference of the ERT’s successful infrastructure work to the European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS) in 1994. ERT efforts had initially put the massive Trans-European Network infrastructure programme (TENs) on the EU political agenda, and ECIS was established in order to ensure its implementation. From its incipience, ECIS has worked in an almost symbiotic relationship with the European Commission, both hoping to speed up the construction of this trans-European infrastructure network.
The ERT’s access to EU decision-making structures has become increasingly institutionalized. This has mainly happened through ERT participation in EU working groups, which are often set up on recommendation of the ERT. The most remarkable example is the Competitiveness Advisory Group (CAG), a working group with official EU status which effectively doubles the voice of the ERT. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) is another example of the increasingly blurred distinction between ERT and EU initiatives. Both the CAG and the TABD focus on the promotion of free trade and measures aimed at improving competitiveness.
Another ERT offspring is the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). After having played an important initial role in putting the EMU project on track, the AMUE now works very closely with the European Commission in the implementation of the monetary union. It enjoys the same access to high-level decision makers both in Brussels and on the national level which has been the key to the ERT’s success.
The ERT, UNICE, ECIS and the AMUE are among the most influential, but by no means the only industrial lobby organizations in Brussels. There are thousands of lobbyists representing hundreds of individual companies, national industry organizations, sectoral lobby groups, and so forth. Another influential lobby group described in this report, and an example of the enormous diversity and flexibility of the EU corporate lobbying landscape, is EuropaBio. This lobby group has achieved disturbing success with its efforts to abolish restrictions in the use of biotechnology.
Finally, an overview of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) who despite a remarkable overlap with the busiest ERT member companies, sings quite a different tune than does the Roundtable, describing itself as one of the world’s most influential green business networks.
Both the ERT and UNICE have worked successfully and at high speed to influence the EU’s current Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) process. Their priorities are very similar: strengthening of the Council and Commission’s power and »ability to act«; ensuring that the EU sticks to previously-adopted schedules (for European Monetary Union, for expansion to Central and Eastern Europe and for global free trade); and preventing that the treaty revision brings in new elements which might endanger their competitive agendas, such as the integration of environmental and social concerns.
Several organizations representing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) are also to be found in Brussels, the most important of which is UEAPME. UEAPME (the European Union of Craftsmen and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises) is represented in numerous advisory bodies in the EU decision-making system, but is denied access to the most important fora, such as the Social Dialogue and high level bodies like the Competitiveness Advisory Group (CAG).
The largest European trade union umbrella is the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation), which is represented in the EU’s Social Dialogue (along with the employers’ organization UNICE and the public sector confederation, CEEP). Both the internal market and broader globalization have undermined the national position of trade unions. And although ETUC as one of the social partners now forms part of the European corporatist system, its position is weak. The Social Chapter prescribes consultation, but employers want to keep commitments to an absolute minimum and there is little they can be forced to do. Trade unions, which remain weak on the European level, and member states are in most cases unable to force employers to commit to social legislation.
The environmental movement finds itself in a similar situation, lacking the financial and organizational means to be adequately represented in Brussels. Another crucial problem is their difficulty in accessing high-level decision makers, especially in the European Commission. The European Parliament is much more accessible, but here industry has also established a strong presence by offering MEPs jobs, assistants and gifts. Most important of all is however the fact that the strength of the environmental movement still lies at the national and local level. European-wide mobilisation with a comparable impact is merely a dream.
A unique new entity on the Brussels scene is European Partners for the Environment (EPE), which is not a lobby group but rather a forum for dialogue between social and environmental groups, public institutions, and industry (not necessarily the progressive type). EPE has organized meetings on specific topics upon request of the European Commission, but has made no attempt to attack the fact that the EU’s overall development model will have strong negative effects on the environment and on people.
The billions of ECU available in different EU funds are another target of corporate lobbying. The example of the Phare and Tacis aid programmes shows how close cooperation between TNCs and EU institutions has resulted in substantial funding for TNCs craving market access in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The main beneficiaries of these ‘aid’ programmes are western corporations.
It is not enough only to look at the democratic gaps in the EU decision-making structure to explain why corporate lobby groups have gained such a strong foothold in the apparatus. The strong grip of TNCs on European economies, which is a direct consequence of the creation of the Internal Market and increasing globalization, must be challenged. Economic dependency upon TNCs leaves governments with little option but to adapt to the agenda proposed by corporate lobby groups. To effectively reduce the political influence of TNCs, European economies must be weaned from their dependence upon these corporations.