The environmental movement lacks the financial and organizational means to be properly represented in Brussels. Another crucial problem is their difficulty in accessing high-level decision makers, especially the Commission. The European Parliament is much more accessible, but here industry has also established a stronger presence by offering MEPs jobs, assistants and gifts. European-wide mobilisation of the environmental movement with a comparable impact as at the national and local level is merely a dream.
Despite the large number of environmental groups officially registered as EU lobbyists, there are in fact very few environmental lobbyists in Brussels. The explanation for this absence seems to be that few environmental groups have the resources to focus on broad European policies -- let alone to base a lobbyist in Brussels. According to one of the few Brussels-based environmental lobbyists, Susan Leubuscher of Greenpeace Germany, »All of the environmental groups are poorly represented. It's embarrassing, because Greenpeace's water campaign is basically myself. Nobody has the manpower.«1 In comparison with the swarms of industry lobbyists to be found in Brussels corridors, environmentalists are an endangered species.
Distance from the European hot spot is another impediment to green voices being heard. Whereas the major industry lobby coalitions have fully-staffed offices in Brussels, the environmental movement tends to be more grassroots and dispersed all over Europe. Joachim Denkinger, Advisor on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the Greens in the European Parliament, points out that »there are some very good people who can lobby well. But it is another problem to invite them so that they can be heard by the Parliament. In the case of hearings, there is no compensation for travel. This is no problem for industry, but it is for NGOs.«2
The few environmentalists that do have the luxury of a Brussels office may find themselves overwhelmed by the complexity and enormity of the issues. Documentation is another area in which industry can excel, at least in quantity if not in quality: »When you lobby the Commission, you see four boxes on the floor full of documents from industry - and the NGOs have sent eight pages,« according to Leubuscher.3
Nonetheless, it appears that when environmental groups do manage to organize representation in Brussels, they are able to arrange high-level meetings. It still remains relatively difficult for environmentalists to obtain hearings with Commissioners; the highly-regarded Brussels-based European Environment Bureau (EEB), the umbrella group for European environmental groups, had until recently met only once in two decades with the Commission President.4 Other high-level decision-makers are more accessible: the EEB has regular meetings with the Council of Ministers and heads of governments. But according to former EEB Chairman Raymond van Ermen5 this access is little more than tokenism. »The system takes care to give NGOs the impression that they are listened to. They are involved in many working groups and advisory committees [...] So it's hard to say that NGOs can't find an entry into the system. But it is fair to say that they are largely kept away from the key decision-making places.«6
And these key places are exactly where industry is busy setting the agenda. Van Ermen mentioned the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (see chapter 2.4) as an example of a realm in which NGOs are unwelcome. He feels that this exclusion is significant, »because what is at stake is the shaping of the economy: globalization, regulations and standards, the WTO and so forth. These fora are where the real critical debates are taking place, and we are not invited.«7
Meetings with European Parliamentarians are easier to arrange. However, the fundamental problem of the shortage of Brussels non-industry lobbyists remains an impediment. Joachim Denkinger says that he has gone so far as to approach trade unions and asks for their input into important proposals. He also mentions that »there are not as many environmental lobbyists involved in the economic committee as I would like there to be«.8 For environmental legislation, this deficiency of non-governmental experts is particularly problematic. When a critical environmental issue comes up in the Parliament, there is no shortage of industrial lobbyists -- Leubuscher compares it to »a rock concert where you need to get there the night before with your sleeping bag and pile up at the door«9 -- but very few environmentalists.
The European Parliament has traditionally been open to any group willing to go to the trouble of being accredited as an official lobbyist. However, perhaps due to the hyper-organization and large capacities of certain lobby sectors, some Parliamentarians and staff complained that they felt harassed by lobbyists tailing them around the halls in Brussels. One MEP staff member confided that »Sometimes there are more lobbyists than deputies in the Parliament.«10
Thus, two reports were introduced into Parliament in 1996: the Ford report (drafted by Labour MEP Glynn Ford) and the Nordmann report (drafted by Radical French MEP Jean-Thomas Nordmann). According to Glynn Ford, »the great majority of MEPs certainly are not corrupt, but the activities of perhaps a dirty dozen or so members could bring the entire assembly into disrepute.«11 Neither proposal went so far as to condemn lobbying in itself, but did make the point that lobbying must be »open and transparent, and that dialogue is not in any danger of turning into ownership.«12
As a result of the discussions, the Parliament agreed to the following:
A code of conduct for lobbyists is still being drafted.
Another structural impediment to the promotion of environmental issues on the EU level is the industrial affinities of some Parliamentarians. For a number of MEPs, the Parliament is just a convenient and prestigious resting place on the industry circuit. It is not uncommon for a Parliamentarian to go straight to work for a transnational company after completing the stint in Brussels. And quite a few MEPs wear two hats even while in Brussels -- making decisions in the Parliament while being paid by industry. For example, Liberal MEP Karin Riis-Jorgensen from Denmark is employed by the large consultancy Coopers & Lybrand, and German MEP Elmar Brok from the CDU is also the EU policy advisor for German media giant Bertelsmann. The Vice Chair of the Environment Committee, Conservative Caroline Jackson from the UK, is a consultant for Mars chocolate. And Danish conservative MEP Christian Rovsing owns Novo Nordisk and other companies active in the nuclear sector, as well as being a member of the Parliament's Committee for Research, Technological Development and Energy.13
The problem of special interests can also be found in the affiliations of MEP assistants. For example, an international tobacco company has allegedly paid for the research staff of one MEP.14 There are no regulations regarding such financing of staff by outside interests, although with the new rules these arrangements must be publicly reported (see above).
Although an improvement over the previous situation, some feel that the new rules (which were significantly watered by conservative elements in the Parliament before finally being adopted) are no great victory. Glynn Ford sees them as an important beginning, despite some vague wording and possible loopholes. »The European Parliament will now work out the details,« he said. »I think we all know that there is a difference between taking a bottle of wine in return for undertaking a speaking engagement, and accepting several crates of champagne or an all-expenses-paid trip overseas.«15
As of yet, lobbyist access to the European Commission has not been addressed.
Intergroups are a little known beast to those outside the European Parliament. Funded by pressure groups or business, they are cross-national and cross-party groups of MEPs which are set up to discuss single issues ranging from animal welfare to Tibet. The nuclear industry, for example, finances an intergroup on energy, and according to one Brussels lobbyist insider, »they define a lot of the formal Energy Committee policy.«
1. Personal interview with Susan Leubuscher, Brussels, 21 February 1997. |back to text|
2. Personal interview with Joachim Denkinger, Brussels, 28 February 1997. |back to text|
3. Personal interview with Susan Leubuscher, Brussels, 21 February 1997. |back to text|
4. Now, however, according to Chairman van Ermen, the EEB has arranged to have annual meetings with the Commission. |back to text|
5. Van Ermen is also Executive Director of European Partners for the Environment, see chapter 4.3. |back to text|
6. Personal interview with Raymond van Ermen, Brussels, 28 February 1997. |back to text|
7. Ibid. |back to text|
8. Personal interview with Joachim Denkinger, 28 February 1997. |back to text|
9. Personal interview with Susan Leubuscher, Brussels, 21 February 1997. |back to text|
10. Confidential source. |back to text|
11. "Turkey's 'Gifts to MEPs' Under Fire", The Guardian, January 1996. |back to text|
12. European Parliament discussion, 16 July 1996. |back to text|
13. "Business lobbying at the European Parliament", Berlingske Tidende, 29 October 1996. |back to text|
14. "Turkey's 'Gifts to MEPs' Under Fire", The Guardian, January 1996. |back to text|
15. "MEPs Tackle Influence of Lobbyists", The Guardian, 18 July 1996. |back to text|